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The federal-state program of unemployment insurance (UI) is well 
established among economic institutions in the United States. It has an 
undeniable influence throughout the economy, affecting personal 
incomes, employer taxes, federal-state relations, and interstate compe 
tition for industrial production and employment.
The UI program serves a variety of functions that help frame 
employment relations between Americans. Over the nearly sixty years 
since the program's inception, these functions have come to be 
accepted and relied upon by both workers and employers.
UI partially replaces lost income for individual workers who are 
involuntarily unemployed, and, in the aggregate, it helps to maintain 
purchasing power during economic downturns. It reduces the dispersal 
of skilled workers when employers impose temporary layoffs and 
helps prevent the breakdown of general labor standards during such 
periods. Some features unique to the UI system in the United States are 
designed to encourage employers to stabilize employment levels.
During the twentieth century, the existence of a reliable system of 
unemployment compensation has become a hallmark of a developed, 
modern industrial economy. Rapidly growing middle-income coun 
tries, from central Europe and sub-Saharan Africa to southeastern Asia, 
are experiencing urbanization of their peoples and are seeking systems
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for insuring incomes. There is a recognition that workers in an indus 
trial economy are separated from the subsistence guaranteed by the 
land in an agrarian society. When designing a safety net for workers, 
these emerging nations are faced with two broadly differing strategies 
concerning UI. 1
The UI approach popular in Europe emphasizes income replacement 
without much attention to return to work or to stabilizing employment. 
The American UI system presents a distinct alternative, which is cus 
tom designed to operate in a competitive market economy. The system 
in the United States emphasizes individual responsibility, while the 
European system views unemployment compensation as a social obli 
gation.
At the core of most contentious issues in the federal-state UI system 
in the United States is the struggle between social generosity and indi 
vidual responsibility. These competing interests must be weighed to 
determine matters such as the scope of coverage, the requirements for 
benefit eligibility, the appropriate level and duration of benefits, and 
the distribution of the financing burden.
Social attitudes about the unemployed as workers and income pro 
viders shape the public view of unemployment. Perceptions about 
employers as business operators and job providers influence how the 
public sees employer responsibilities for workers. Also critical to 
resolving UI issues are public attitudes regarding the proper role of 
government in dealing with the problem of unemployment.
The diverse issues generated by conflicting public opinions are diffi 
cult to sort out neatly. Yet, this chapter attempts to make a brief exposi 
tion of some of these attitudes and of the broader and more 
fundamental controversies they engender so as to help illuminate the 
later discussions of specific program issues. In the next section, the 
genesis of the UI program and the controversies surrounding it are 
examined. This analysis begins with a brief review of the historical 
context of UI and is followed by a discussion of public attitudes toward 
unemployment and about UI. The third section of this chapter, which 
considers UI in the larger context of economic security, includes a dis 
cussion of the distinctions between UI and welfare programs, UI as 
part of the whole social safety net, and the role of UI in the overall 
economy. Conflicting and shifting viewpoints about the causes of 
unemployment and the character of the unemployed then lead to an
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overview of the basic controversy concerning the UI program's effects 
on the incentive to work. Fifth, the subjective element of an individ 
ual's unemployment is considered as the basis for questions about fair 
ness and efficiency in administration and about possible fraud and 
abuse of the system. The sixth section discusses the controversy arising 
from employers and workers pressed to advance their particular eco 
nomic interests in regard to issues of UI taxation and benefit levels. 
The conflict inherent in the federal-state relationship on which the UI 
system is built is subsequently reviewed as a source of dispute in the 
program. The chapter concludes with reflection on whether and how 
knowledge about the working of UI is used to improve the system.
Genesis of the Program and Controversy
Historical Context of Controversy
The federal government's adoption of a major, active role in social 
planning during the Great Depression provoked widespread public 
controversy because that move departed from the traditional laissez- 
faire approach of government. Prior to the 1930s, unemployment was 
not regarded as much more than a temporary and occasional problem, 
an inevitable seasonal or cyclical malady of industrial society. Once 
business and employment recovered, public concern about unemploy 
ment faded. Workers who experienced much unemployment were 
often seen as responsible for their own predicament. They were viewed 
as either not industrious enough to hold steady jobs or fundamentally 
flawed in their character. In cases where job and wage loss produced 
temporary family deprivation, local privately funded welfare agencies 
were regarded as the appropriate sources of assistance. In some areas, 
public unemployment relief was provided by local government. 2
Public UI proposals were advanced in a number of states before 
1930, but these initiatives were not broadly accepted given prevailing 
attitudes. The thought of federal government intervention to deal with 
unemployment was an even more remote idea and viewed as probably 
unconstitutional. Most employers did not see provision for the unem 
ployed as a responsibility of business. The few who did thought that
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unemployment benefit plans should be provided by employers on a pri 
vate, voluntary basis.
The reality of mass unemployment during the depression of the 
1930s made clear that personal deficiency was not the only cause of the 
problem. As joblessness reached into the homes of executives, white- 
collar workers, and skilled mechanics—people who heretofore had 
been untouched by unemployment—the realization grew that the 
industrious and efficient worker as well as the marginal, unstable, lazy 
worker could be affected. Moreover, the problem was not of brief dura 
tion; unemployment persisted. Personal economic hardship among the 
jobless became widespread. Efforts to ease these difficulties over 
whelmed private welfare resources and local government relief. Resis 
tance to large-scale government assistance for the unemployed could 
not long withstand the pressures exerted by the massive needs of so 
many over so many years.
Old attitudes began to give way, though not willingly or universally. 
The exposure of millions of workers and their families to the indignity 
of applying for and accepting relief shifted opinions sufficiently to 
broaden the support for unemployment benefits provided on an orderly, 
prefunded, social insurance basis. Employer organizations continued to 
resist the coming of UI, but with the continuation of the depression, it 
could no longer be denied.
The federal-state unemployment compensation program was autho 
rized as part of the Social Security Act enacted August 14, 1935. As a 
result of tax offset inducements contained in the companion Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act, by July 1937, in all states plus Alaska, 
Hawaii, and the District of Columbia, legislation had been passed to 
create UI programs. "The constitutionality of the state and federal laws 
was challenged in several states as soon as [UI] taxes became payable 
on employment after January 1, 1936. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the New York law in November 1936, and that 
of the Social Security Act and the Alabama Unemployment Compensa 
tion Act in May 1937" (Rosbrow 1986, p. 7). In writing the majority 
opinion, Justice Benjamin Cardozo asserted that it was not a lack of 
compassion for the unemployed, but rather a reluctance to competi 
tively disadvantage native industries that discouraged states from inde 
pendently establishing UI systems before 1935.
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While the depression altered general attitudes enough to make the 
federal-state UI system possible, the opposing points of view did not 
disappear. Today, UI is widely accepted as a permanent public pro 
gram. Millions of Americans, however, still find it difficult to accom 
modate themselves philosophically to the idea that unemployed 
workers should be allowed to receive benefits as a matter of right even 
if they do not appear to need them. Unemployment is recognized as a 
continuing problem, although it is more acute during dips in the busi 
ness cycle than at other times. Most unemployment is viewed as the 
consequence of impersonal economic forces, but during nonrecession 
periods, the belief that unemployment is the fault of the worker usually 
resurfaces. Thus, this classical view of unemployment lives on within 
the populace and forms a significant basis for continued controversy 
about many UI aspects and for resistance to the program's expansion 
and improvement.
In the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, this perspective on unem 
ployment has been partially offset by a growing public awareness of 
the impact of permanent worker dislocation, which results from 
increasingly competitive markets at home and abroad and from the 
impacts of rapid technological change. The widespread potential for 
worker dislocation has caused the public to be more concerned about 
unemployment, even in nonrecessionary times. 3
Public Attitudes toward Unemployment in a Market Economy
As noted, the general view prior to the 1930s was that unemploy 
ment was primarily the result of the individual's own deficiency. The 
experience of the Great Depression shook this position, but its hold on 
the public mind has remained a strong force, making difficult nearly 
every effort to extend and improve the UI program.
One expression of this view appeared in the Wall Street Journal in 
1914:
Let any man ask himself how often has he seen really industrious 
workmen out of employment for any length of time, except by 
their own choice in a labor dispute? The man who wants work can 
get it, and can soon establish a character that will get him better 
work (Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1914).
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In her classic 1930 analysis of case studies of unemployed persons, 
Clinch Calkins summed up the earlier attitudes as follows:
There are several widely held ideas about unemployment... . One 
of them is that unemployment comes only in hard times. ... A 
second presumption is that under unemployment only those who 
have been too thriftless to save suffer. And still a third, the most 
pervasive of all, is that if a man really wants to find work, he can 
find it (Calkins 1930, pp. 20-21).
A quarter of a century after the federal-state UI system had been 
established, a sample survey of urban Ohio households gave evidence 
that a large proportion of Americans still held to the idea that those 
who truly want work can always find a job. When asked "whose fault is 
it when people become unemployed?" 37 percent of employees, 38 
percent of the self-employed, and 58 percent of employers interviewed 
put the blame on the unemployed themselves (Ohio State University 
Research Foundation 1963). Among employees, those in professional 
occupations were most likely to respond this way (48 percent). Profes 
sionals were also least likely to experience unemployment. Among 
unskilled workers, the proportion blaming workers for their own unem 
ployment was much less (23 percent). The higher respondents' educa 
tional attainment, the more likely they were to blame a jobless worker 
for being unemployed and, as noted by the survey report:
The people with the greater amounts of formal education, presum 
ably the most informed people, are those who most likely have 
been exposed to the ideas of economics, including the widely-held 
notion of involuntary unemployment. Yet this seems to make little 
difference regarding their beliefs about the reasons for unemploy 
ment. It must be, therefore, that this attitude is the manifestation 
of a more-or-less deeply held belief that is not susceptible to alter 
ation or modification merely through exposure to the thinking and 
opinions of those generally regarded as "experts" (Ohio State Uni 
versity Research Foundation 1963, p. 33).
Adams (1971, p. 22) reviewed a 1965 Gallup Poll conducted for the 
Washington Post in which 75 percent of a national sample responded 
yes when asked, "Do you think many people collect unemployment 
benefits even though they could find work?" (Washington Post, Sep 
tember 16, 1965). Respondents were more likely to answer in the affir 
mative if they had higher incomes and more education.
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Since the 1960s, there have not been any surveys specifically mea 
suring the extent of public belief that unemployment is the fault of the 
individual. Views expressed on occasion in the news media or by busi 
ness and political leaders give evidence that this attitude still holds to a 
significant and influential degree. These opinions may be heard as 
complaints that positions go unfilled while jobless workers crowd the 
UI rolls.4
Recognition that the unemployed may not always match the require 
ments of the vacant jobs, or that their location may be wrong, or that 
employers seeking workers may not always be willing to offer reason 
able wages sometimes tempers such a blanket indictment. Citing case 
studies of unemployed white collar workers, a March 1993 cover story 
in Fortune magazine said that "while the economy is growing steadily 
again, more than nine million Americans remain jobless, victims of 
changes they cannot control" (Erdman 1993, pp. 40-49).
Regardless of who is to blame for unemployment, the American 
public regards it as a serious national problem. When asked in 1994 by 
Princeton Survey Research Associates for Newsweek magazine, "How 
concerned are you about the effects of unemployment and a lack of 
good-paying jobs?" 92 percent of the national sample of 742 adults 
said that they were either somewhat or very concerned.
In a series of national surveys conducted between 1988 and 1995 by 
the Hart and Teeter Research Companies for NEC News and the Wall 
Street Journal, registered voters were asked, "Which of the following 
list of economic issues facing the country do you feel is the most 
important right now: inflation, unemployment, interest rates, the Fed 
eral budget deficit, Federal taxes, or the U.S. trade deficit?" 5 The sur 
vey was conducted more than a dozen times, at approximately six- 
month intervals. Unemployment and the federal budget deficit always 
topped the list of most important economic issues. In June 1988, unem 
ployment was picked by 28 percent, while 34 percent said the deficit; 
by January 1992, as unemployment had risen, 53 percent said unem 
ployment, while 16 percent said the deficit; and by January 1995, as 
unemployment fell, the responses were nearly identical to those in June 
1988. Public sentiment expressed in these survey results clearly 
reflects the competing pressures on UI policy makers. Notably, survey 
respondents indicated the third most pressing economic issue to be fed 
eral taxes.
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Public Attitudes toward Unemployment Insurance
Many Americans have viewed UI not as a social insurance program 
but more like welfare and other public assistance programs. As such, 
these individuals consider UI as running counter to such historic values 
as individual and local self-reliance and a free market economy. Writ 
ing in the mid-1950s, the historian Max Lerner noted in his study 
America As Civilization that the process of social reform and increased 
assumption by the state of responsibility for certain needs of the people 
had been going on since the start of the century, and that the process 
was opposed throughout by various interest groups, in part by invoking 
those historic values. These public programs developed with great dif 
ficulty, much reluctance, and almost grudgingly. Lerner wrote that 
Americans
have responded piecemeal and in irregular fashion to the need for 
workmen's compensation, unemployment benefits, old-age insur 
ance, subsidized low-cost housing (etc.) . . . what has emerged in 
each area of welfare is the acceptance of the principle of responsi 
bility but with the least challenge to private enterprise, the least 
burden on the tax structure, and the greatest reliance on the volun 
tary principle. The broad formula has been for the government to 
set a floor below which security and welfare cannot fall, to use 
government funds for the more claimant forms of social insurance 
but to let the others go, to give the states the widest possible dis 
cretion, to steer away from centralized authority and administra 
tion...to put the burden of expanding the programs upon continued 
popular pressures (Lerner 1957, p. 131).
In this passage, Lerner identified the heart of much of the basic UI 
controversy. The program was designed to minimize any disruption to 
the private free market system. Political pressures work toward keeping 
it contained. Employers have sought to keep their responsibility for 
financing unemployment compensation narrow and limited. Through 
its experience-rated UI tax structure, the program seeks to allocate 
responsibility for benefit charges among those businesses giving rise to 
those charges; this tax structure thereby also gives employers an incen 
tive to avoid layoffs and to stabilize employment. 6 Experience rating 
also results in constant pressure from employers to keep compensation
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levels at a low level of protection, so that benefit charges and UI taxes 
can be held to a minimum.
From the beginning, the states have enjoyed wide discretion in set 
ting specific benefit and tax provisions of their UI laws. Furthermore, 
there has been resistance to any attempts to set federal minimum stan 
dards or to any strengthening of federal authority in the program. 
Expansion of the program has usually occurred only when organized 
labor has been strong enough, or when unemployment has been wide 
spread enough, to bring sufficient pressure on the state legislatures or 
on Congress to act.
Despite resistance, government entitlement programs have multi 
plied and expanded over the years. UI evolved into a broader program 
than at first deemed appropriate or affordable when it was initiated dur 
ing the Great Depression. The system now covers nearly all wage and 
salary workers and provides much longer periods of protection than it 
did originally.
Adams (1971) provided a comprehensive review of American senti 
ments in Public Attitudes Toward Unemployment Insurance. In sum 
marizing evidence of declining American support for UI from the 
1930s through the 1960s, as preserved in the archives of the Social 
Security Administration by the Roper Center, Adams wrote the follow 
ing:
The Social Security Act programs were deeply rooted in the Great 
Depression experience. The effects of that experience on public 
attitudes have diminished as time has passed and memories have 
dimmed. . . . Those people who were 10 years old or over in 1930 
and therefore may be presumed to have personal memories of the 
Great Depression years constituted 50 percent of the population 
over 19 years of age in 1965 ... 38 percent by 1970 . . . and 22 
percent by 1980. . . . The impact of the Great Depression on atti 
tudes toward the unemployed and unemployment insurance will 
be transmitted indirectly, if at all, to succeeding generations, and 
this fact may be expected to have substantial influence on the pro 
gram in the future (Adams 1971, pp. 17-18).
By the 1980s, for many Americans, the expansion of social pro 
grams and government regulation of economic activity had gone too 
far. This reaction lent support to attempts at limiting the scope of some 
programs, to reducing their size, and to restoring the vigor of free mar-
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ket principles throughout the economy. 7 In the mid-1990s, the exigen 
cies of persistent federal budget deficits further curtailed government 
largess and involvement.
These trends have affected the UI program as well, influencing the 
movement toward more restricted eligibility, more punitive disqualifi 
cations among beneficiaries, and more limited levels and duration of 
benefits. 8 Nonetheless, nationwide surveys of public sentiment indicate 
broad-based support for the present system of income security for 
workers. When asked in 1987 by an ABC News/'Washington Post sur 
vey if spending on UI should be increased, decreased, or kept about the 
same, 86 percent of a national sample of 1,505 adults said that spend 
ing should be increased or kept the same. When the National Opinion 
Research Center asked the same question in 1990, 75 percent of 1,217 
adult respondents in a national survey said that spending on UI should 
be increased or kept the same. In January 1995, when the Los Angeles 
Times asked a national sample of 1,353 adults, "Do you think govern 
ment should cut back spending on unemployment insurance pro 
grams?" only 30 percent answered yes.
In the 1990s, the reality of increased worker dislocation, greater 
public awareness of this issue, and the need to provide early, system 
atic reemployment assistance resulted in a policy response that began 
directing the UI system more toward reemployment. The 1993 Worker 
Profiling and Re-employment Services (WPRS) system mandates 
nationwide an additional UI eligibility requirement of early active 
reemployment efforts for beneficiaries who are identified as most 
likely to exhaust their entitlement. The emphasis on reemployment— 
and economic development—further resulted in legislation allowing 
states the option of using UI trust fund money to help "profiled" bene 
ficiaries become self employed; the enabling legislation was included 
in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was 
signed into law by President Clinton in November 1993. The UI pro 
gram has also adopted an ongoing, active approach toward the preven 
tion of unemployment; this strategy is based on state "work sharing" 
programs. Work sharing schemes have been included in the UI provi 
sions of 18 states since 1978, when California enacted the first work 
sharing program in the U.S.9
The ebb and flow of prevalent views about the role of government in 
the economy and society will no doubt continue indefinitely, influ-
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enced largely by how economic conditions affect public attitudes gen 
erally. That ebb and flow will ensure the continuation of controversy 
surrounding UI as it reflects the tensions between social equity and 
economic efficiency.
Unemployment Insurance and Economic Security
The Welfare-Insurance Dichotomy
The widespread hardship endured in the 1930s made large public 
relief programs politically acceptable. At that time, the typical worker 
struggled alone to sustain a family, which tended to be larger than is 
the average family late in the twentieth century. Multiple-earner house 
holds were comparatively rare in the 1930s. Loss of work by the bread 
winner put families into a crisis situation very quickly. The depression 
spread penury like a plague among families that heretofore had 
escaped serious unemployment. Needy individuals and families who 
accepted relief suffered social indignity and loss of self-respect. Con 
sequently, the concept of unemployment benefits provided on an insur 
ance basis had considerable appeal. 10
The idea that contributions to a reserve fund, based on earnings, 
could provide workers surety against the risk of total wage loss from 
unemployment came to be regarded as far superior to reliance on char 
ity or on relief, which required a painful public admission of poverty. 
Rights to UI benefits were earned through working; the question of 
demonstrated individual need was irrelevant. The insurance concept 
became and remains important to workers.
UI is social insurance, not private insurance. The major differences 
between the two are summarized in table 1.1. Indeed, many of the fea 
tures of UI that make it social insurance also mean that its existence 
would be impossible under private arrangements. Without government 
mandate, nothing like UI as we know it would be available: because of 
a type of market failure, private markets would not provide what soci 
ety requires as generalized insurance against unemployment for work 
ers. 11
12 Policy Issues
Table 1.1 Major Differences between Social and Private Insurance
Social insurance Private insurance
1. Compulsory
2. Minimum floor of income 
protection
3. Emphasis on social adequacy 
(welfare element)
4. Benefits prescribed by law that can 
be changed (statutory right)
5. Government monopoly
6. Costs difficult to predict
7. Full funding not needed because of 
compulsory contributions from 
new entrants and because program 
is assumed to last indefinitely
8. No underwriting
9. Widespread differences of opinion 
regarding objectives and results
10. Investments generally in
obligations of federal government
11. Taxing power readily available to 
combat erosion by inflation
Voluntary
Larger amounts available, 
depending on individual desires and 
ability to pay
Emphasis on individual equity 
(insurance element)
Benefits established by legal 
contract (contractual right)
Competition
Costs more readily predictable
Must operate on fully funded basis 
without reliance on new entrants' 
contributions
Individual or group underwriting
Opinions generally more uniform 
regarding objectives and results
Investments mainly in private 
channels
Greater vulnerability to inflation
SOURCE- Rejda (1984, p 40)
The UI program aims to provide protection against a risk so wide 
spread that it is social in scope. Without some organized system of 
relief against unemployment, massive problems of social dependency 
could result. UI benefits provide a minimum floor of protection that 
prevents individuals from becoming a social burden and that collec 
tively helps to minimize fluctuations in aggregate consumer spending. 
This public good would not be available without government-man 
dated participation in the system. If the UI program were voluntary, it 
would collapse very quickly. Workers with a low risk of job separation 
would realize that they could save money on premium payments by
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breaking away and forming their own low-risk pool. This would even 
tually result in those with a high risk of unemployment facing premi 
ums so large that they would go uninsured, leaving them with public or 
private social assistance as their only means of income security. 12
Social insurance embodies both the incentive aspects found in pri 
vate insurance contracts and the eligibility features required by consid 
erations of social adequacy. Private insurance contracts provide 
payment for losses due to occurrence of the insured risk, with the com 
pensation amount dependent on premiums paid. Social insurance bases 
amounts of payments on some estimation of presumed need, so that 
compensation is not always directly related to contributions, and eligi 
bility is not always based on the ability to avoid the risk. UI places a 
ceiling on how far benefits can go in compensating for wage loss, 
thereby reducing the fraction of earnings replaced for higher-wage 
earners. Some state weekly benefit formulas weight the benefit-wage 
replacement ratio to favor low-wage earners. Some states provide 
allowances for dependents. These provisions reflect the social welfare 
intent of the program to concentrate benefits more on those who are 
presumed to need them more. Although its insurance character is well 
established and supported, the extent to which the program should 
reflect welfare objectives has been a source of some controversy.
There is a handful of features that objectively distinguish UI from 
welfare. When characterizing social insurance, Rejda stated five clear 
distinctions from social welfare, which apply to UI and can be summa 
rized as follows.
1. UI benefit levels are predictable since they are based on explicit for 
mulae that apply to applicants uniformly, while in relief programs 
the benefit is dependent on the degree of need demonstrated.
2. Financing is done out of specifically earmarked taxes, while public 
assistance is paid from general revenues.
3. All those covered by UI are participants in the program, with only a 
fraction ever drawing benefits, while only those who apply for and 
receive benefits are participants in social welfare programs.
4. No stigma attaches to the receipt of a UI payment, "which provides 
compensation for wage loss as a matter of right with dignity and dis 
patch." 13
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5. The UI program presumes need due to the economic loss resulting 
from unemployment, while general relief requires demonstration of 
need, often including the shedding of personal assets.
The last of the preceding differences probably has contributed most 
to the UI controversy. The welfare aspects of UI have been drawn into 
question because of the changing perception of the economic position 
of American workers and their families. The circumstances of the aver 
age worker today are far different from those of the average worker 
more than a half century ago. By and large, the public in the 1990s is 
less likely to regard unemployment with the same sense of urgency or 
to see the unemployed so generally in such desperate straits as was the 
case in the 1930s. Need is not so widely presumed to be as universal or 
as evenly felt among various segments of the unemployed.
In the Great Depression, the real extent of the unemployment prob 
lem was not precisely known. Estimates hovered in the range of 15 to 
25 percent of the labor force being out of work (Levitan, Mangum and 
Marshall 1981). Reliable national income accounting and labor force 
estimation practices were undeveloped. 14 Since that time, information 
about the operation of the economy has steadily improved, and, for bet 
ter or worse, has guided national economic policy. The result of this 
evolution, together with other institutional reforms in the social, legal, 
banking, and trade sectors, has been that none of the ten economic 
recessions since 1946 has even approached the widespread collapse of 
economic activity suffered in the 1930s (Moore 1980; U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1995).
This relatively stable labor market has greatly reduced the personal 
fear of unemployment. For the large majority of Americans, the Great 
Depression is an item in history rather than a personal memory. Most 
have never known serious unemployment or felt its consequences close 
at hand. Many do not identify with the unemployed. On the other hand, 
increasing worker dislocation over the past twenty years has spread the 
potential for permanent job loss, bringing the uncertainty of employ 
ment to white-collar workers, where it previously belonged primarily 
to blue-collar workers.
Workers today also enjoy a much improved standard of living. The 
multiple-earner household is more the rule than the exception, giving 
many families a broader income base and less vulnerability to the
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effects of job loss by one family member. Unemployment for any 
lengthy period can still produce heavy financial strains, even disaster, 
as many households have built their higher living standards on a base 
of substantial indebtedness as well as on increased income.
There has been some pressure for better protection under the pro 
gram for the unemployed who clearly are in need. Some UI critics see 
the program largely as protection for the middle-class worker: many of 
the poor, low-wage, or marginal workers who are unemployed are 
either excluded or receive very inadequate benefits. It has been sug 
gested that, to broaden access to the program, eligibility requirements 
be relaxed so that marginally attached workers may qualify for some 
UI benefits. Sharply increased minimum weekly benefit amounts could 
be justified on the ground that existing low minimums inadequately 
support even a subsistence standard of living. Others argue that benefit 
levels are sufficient, but that benefit durations are inadequate. Many 
industrialized nations supplement UI benefits with unemployment 
assistance, which provides means tested income support for people 
who have recently exhausted UI benefits. Unemployment assistance 
usually is available for up to a year, with the idea that it will prevent 
slippage into long-term dependence on social assistance by prolonging 
the period of hope for reemployment. 15
The atmosphere of controversy surrounding specific UI issues has 
been intensified due to the conflict between calls for expanded welfare 
content in the UI program and calls for closer adherence to strict insur 
ance principles in the face of a growing perception of general worker 
affluence and of a narrowed presumption of need. However, by a large 
margin, the public as of 1980 still regarded the payment of unemploy 
ment benefits as earned insurance rights rather than as welfare assis 
tance. A national survey conducted in 1980 by the Survey Research 
Center of the University of Michigan found that almost twice as many 
American families characterized unemployment compensation as 
"earned insurance" than thought it was "part of our welfare system" 
(59 percent to 32 percent). "Households in which one or more mem 
bers were unemployed at some time during the two years prior to the 
surveys more frequently viewed unemployment compensation as 
earned insurance, especially if the unemployed household member 
actually received unemployment compensation (78 percent) . . . [com 
pared with] 56 percent of the households who had no unemployment
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experience during the prior two years" (Curtin, Gordon and Ponza 
1981, p. 41).
Defenders of the program's insurance principle emphasize that UI is 
not intended as a measure to overcome existing poverty but rather to 
prevent descent into poverty. Although workers today are generally 
better off than their counterparts of earlier times, they still face the real 
risk of job loss with severe consequences. Relatively few wage or sala 
ried workers could long withstand a total loss of their earnings before 
their achieved standards of living were damaged badly. Even in multi 
ple-earner families, where the loss of one income may be partially 
cushioned by the remaining incomes of other household members, the 
loss may be severely felt because of high customary expenditure and 
consumer debt levels.
The lack of adequate welfare support for needy, involuntarily unem 
ployed persons who can and want to work and who fall outside the 
scope of UI is a problem that the system cannot effectively resolve in 
its present form. Helping the poor unemployed to overcome their pov 
erty through employment is a policy no one can oppose. Preventing 
workers from slippage toward poverty because of prolonged temporary 
job and wage loss is a more manageable task.
The values of the insurance approach go beyond that of using pre 
sumed need instead of the individual needs test. Insuring against wage 
loss due to involuntary unemployment makes at least as much sense as 
insuring a home against fire damage or a car against theft, regardless of 
the personal ability to absorb the financial loss. Wage loss is only par 
tially insured, with limits applicable as to amounts and length of time. 
Employer payments into public funds for unemployment benefits are 
part of the cost of labor compensation, which includes wages and other 
fringe benefits. Workers earn UI rights through their employment and 
indirectly pay part of the premium by accepting wages that are some 
what lower than they would be in the absence of UI (Anderson and 
Meyer 1995). Regardless of personal financial circumstances, if their 
employment terminates involuntarily, workers have the right to unem 
ployment benefits until they either find other employment or exhaust 
their entitlement. Unemployment benefits are not a charge on society 
as a whole, financed out of general government revenues, as is the case 
with welfare. Within the context of these UI characteristics, presumed 
need remains valid regardless of individual variations in need. Loss of
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income can be damaging to the unemployed worker's household 
finances if not limited to some reasonable degree.
Unlike private insurance payments, unemployment benefits reflect 
certain overtones of welfare since some of the limits satisfy social pol 
icy goals rather than purely actuarial considerations. Hence, UI is 
social insurance. The implicit presumption of need also has socially 
oriented limits. The controversy in applying limits focuses on the 
weekly amount and on the duration of payments.
The Role of Unemployment Insurance in the Overall Economy
One of the main reasons UI is compulsory public social insurance as 
opposed to private insurance is because it is the only way to achieve 
nearly universal coverage in the population. In performing the central 
income replacement function, with nearly all workers covered, the sys 
tem works to arrest declining income of the unemployed, reduce the 
potential increase in welfare dependency, and slow the decline in 
aggregate spending when the economy moves into a recession. The 
direct cost of UI is paid by employers through payroll taxes. It has been 
argued that these costs affect the economy by influencing business 
location decisions.
In the aggregate, UI benefits constitute a nonnegligible portion of 
total spending in the economy. As summarized in table 1.2, between 
1938 and 1995 UI benefits usually hovered in a range between one- 
quarter and three-quarters of 1 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). The annual figures in the table also make it clear that UI con 
tributes a larger share of total spending in recession years than in 
expansion years and that the boost in spending is appreciable and 
rapid. For example, during the 1957-1958 recession, UI benefit pay 
ments rose from 0.39 percent to 0.77 percent of GDP, and, during the 
1974-1975 recession, payments rose from 0.41 percent to 0.74 percent 
of GDP. Burtless (1991, p. 38) has argued that "changes in the system 
over the past decade have eroded the value of unemployment insurance 
both as income protection for the unemployed and as an automatic sta 
bilizer." It is easy to see in table 1.2 that the spike in benefits as a per 
centage of GDP was much smaller in the 1990-1991 recession than in 
many previous postwar recessions. 16 This partly reflects the tighter eli 
gibility conditions and diminished real benefit levels imposed by many 
of the states in response to financial crises in the early 1980s.
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1996), U.S. Department of Commerce (various issues).
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When we look at the dollars of UI benefits as a share of GDP, we see 
only the direct first-order effect of UI on aggregate spending. It should 
be recognized that spending of UI benefits becomes money income to 
others who again spend a part of it, and so on. The cumulative effect of 
all the spending is called the multiplier. For the nation as a whole, Oax- 
aca and Taylor (1983, p. 6) estimated that "for each dollar of UI benefit 
payments in 1975 .. . disposable income was increased by $1.02." Per 
centage effects estimated by Oaxaca and Taylor (1986) of UI benefit 
payments on local economies were even larger, at 3.18 percent of real 
disposable income in Phoenix and 2.16 percent in Tucson for 1976. 17
UI is also considered to have an impact on the economy because of 
the payroll tax charged to employers to finance the system. While 
Anderson and Meyer (1995) estimate that this cost is partly shared by 
workers who contribute to the system by accepting lower wages, it has 
been argued widely that UI taxes are one of the factors figuring into 
business decisions about where to locate or to expand operations. This 
thesis was put forward more generally in terms of all area-specific tax 
levies by Due:
On the basis of all available studies, it is obvious that relatively 
high business tax levels do not have the disastrous effects claimed 
for them. . . . However, without doubt, in some instances the tax 
element plays the deciding role in determining the optimum loca 
tion, since other factors balance (Due 1961, p. 171).
Interstate variation in business taxes was examined by Wheaton 
(1983), who suggested that these differences may affect business loca 
tion decisions within small geographic areas such as at interstate bor 
ders. Among individual categories of taxes that vary across states, 
Wheaton (1983, p. 85) estimated that property taxes constitute 42 per 
cent of tax payments; UI taxes are tied for second with state corporate 
income taxes, each of which receives 18 percent of total state tax pay 
ments made by business. In a survey article, Newman and Sullivan 
(1988, p. 232) conclude that "the most recent studies, employing more 
detailed data sets and more refined econometric techniques, have gen 
erated results which cast some doubt on the received conclusion that 
tax effects are generally negligible." While the role of UI as a built-in 
economic stabilizer is widely acknowledged as significant and useful, 
interstate differences in the employer cost of the program remain an 
area of constant controversy.
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Unemployment Insurance as Part of the Social Safety Net
The social safety net in the United States is an intertwined web of 
public and private programs that naturally divide into two main catego 
ries. One group of programs is for labor force members with a reason 
able history of job attachment; eligibility for these programs is usually 
independent of individual or household income levels. The other group 
provides benefits without regard to attachment to the labor force and 
generally requires a low-income test. UI may be viewed as a keystone 
in the arch supporting that portion of the U.S. social safety net 
designed for workers attached to the labor force.
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Department Operations, 
Nutrition and Foreign Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Jane L. Ross, Director for Income 
Security Issues of the U.S. General Accounting Office, provided an 
overview of means-tested programs:
In fiscal year 1992, the federal government provided about $208 
billion in six areas of need for low-income people. When state 
dollars are included, the total amount of spending reached $290 
billion.
The welfare system comprises about 80 programs, representing 
about 15 percent of total federal outlays in fiscal year 1992. 
Included in the system are AFDC, Medicaid, SSI, and Food Stamp 
programs. These four means-tested programs accounted for 20 
percent of the $700 billion spent in fiscal year 1993 on the 10 larg 
est entitlement and mandatory spending programs. [18] The sys 
tem's nearly 80 programs target low-income individuals and 
families to meet two broad objectives: (1) to provide basic support 
and health care for those who are often unable to support them 
selves—the aged, blind, disabled, and children—and (2) to pro 
vide transitional assistance to able-bodied adults and their families 
while promoting self-sufficiency, table 1 [1.3] highlights the fed 
eral spending levels in some of the largest programs in each area 
(Ross 1995, p. 2).
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Table 1.3 Selected Means-Tested Programs in Six Functional Areas 
(Dollars in Billions)
FY 1992 estimated 
Functional area/program expenditures
Income support
Aid to Families with Dependent Children $13.6
Supplemental Security Income 18.7
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 9.6
Medical care
Medicaid 67.8




Special Supplemental Food Program for Women,
Infants and Children (WIC) 2.6
School Breakfast .8
Housing
Section 8 Housing Assistance 12.3
Low-Rent Public Housing 5.0
Education and training
Stafford Loans and Pell Grants 11.1
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 3.9
Head Start 2.2
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS)
Training Program .6
Other services
Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) 2.8 
Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) .8 
Child Care—AFDC, Transitional, and At-Risk .8 
Community Services Block Grant (CSBG)_____________A____
SOURCE Ross (1995, p. 3).
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Many industrialized nations bridge the gap between UI and welfare 
with a program of unemployment assistance, which is a means-tested 
benefit for people who have recently exhausted UI benefits. In the 
United States, while the duration of UI benefit payments may be 
extended depending on the condition of the economy, there is no stan 
dard benefit program to help individual UI benefit exhaustees in the 
absence of a widespread recession.
Apart from UI, the main body of public programs for people with 
labor market attachment or aspirations consists of retraining programs. 
In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources, Clarence C. Crawford, Associate Director of the U.S. Gen 
eral Accounting Office for Education and Employment Issues, stated 
that
. . . legislation enacted in the last Congress identified at least 163 
programs administered by 15 different agencies that provide about 
$20 billion in employment training assistance for adults and out- 
of-school youths..."employment training programs" refers to pro 
grams or funding streams that (1) help the unemployed find jobs, 
(2) create job opportunities, and (3) enhance the skills of partici 
pants to increase their employability (Crawford 1995, p. 1).
This list includes everything from the Food Stamp Employment and 
Training program administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
to improve the ability of food stamp recipients to gain employment, 
increase earnings, and reduce their dependency on public assistance, to 
the All-Volunteer Force Educational Assistance program administered 
by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, which aims to assist in 
developing a more highly educated and productive workforce by help 
ing service-persons readjust to civilian life through educational bene 
fits. The complexity of eligibility conditions and benefits available 
from the 163 different federal employment and training programs has 
spurred efforts to establish a unified "one-stop-shopping" training sys 
tem.
The reemployment system most closely linked to the UI system is 
the state-operated Employment Service (ES). While there have been 
calls for a new institution to act as a reemployment clearing house, the 
ES has been touted by some as the natural point of entry for one-stop 
shopping. The ES is an existing agency with a statutory funding stream
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authorized by the Wagner-Peyser Act, and it has strong state relation 
ships with existing offices in 1,700 locations.
The widespread ES presence has also raised the issue of whether a 
newly proposed one-stop reemployment services delivery system 
needs another physical institution. Simultaneously, there is recognition 
of the prospect that the new institution could be a virtual one-stop- 
shopping place for reemployment services, operating in cyberspace as 
an electronic network among existing physical locations. Eligibility for 
various programs and options available to an individual could be deter 
mined through the electronic information network. Under virtual one- 
stop shopping, the system would be most encompassing if any existing 
agency could serve as a port of entry, so that there would be one-stop 
shopping with multiple points of entry.
The ES link with the UI system was forged through cooperation in 
enforcing the work test for UI benefit eligibility. Further links have 
been provided since 1982, as the ES has been involved in referring 
beneficiaries who exhaust UI entitlement to retraining programs 
administered under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). The most 
recent reemployment initiative in UI, the Worker Profiling and Reem 
ployment Services (WPRS) system, has relied heavily on the ES to 
provide early intervention reemployment services to UI claimants 
identified as being most likely to exhaust benefits.
Historically, there has been a general reluctance to fund active labor 
market programs other than the ES from the Unemployment Trust 
Fund. Congress and the executive branch have faced strong opposition 
from the employer community regarding possible funding of retraining 
and other reemployment services from the Unemployment Trust Fund. 
Employers believe that active labor market programs should be paid 
for out of general revenue and question their responsibility for training 
the potential workforce of competitors. Since the Unemployment Trust 
Fund frequently contains a large reserve for recessionary periods, it has 
often become the target for alternative uses when reserves increase 
during periods of low unemployment. 19
With increased concern about maintaining employment and return 
ing unemployed workers to productive jobs, the UI program has taken 
a more active role in reemployment policy. UI funds are being used to 
pay for two types of active employment efforts: work sharing, which is 
a form of partial UI benefits, and self-employment allowances, which
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are UI benefits received while starting a new business. On the other 
hand, there is no movement to allow the Unemployment Trust Fund to 
pay for retraining or reemployment services such as job search assis 
tance. Under the WPRS initiative, the UI program conducts profiling, 
but the provision of reemployment services, such as testing, counsel 
ing, job clubs, and job search workshops, cannot be funded by the UI 
system. These services must be provided by the ES or the JTPA pro 
gram. Together, these active labor market efforts are linking UI with 
initiatives that strengthen the social safety net and help labor force 
members from slipping toward public support.
Incentives for Job Search and Employment
Along with the view that the unemployed generally could find work 
if they wanted to is a related belief that the payment of unemployment 
benefits diminishes the recipient's incentive to work or to seek work. 
The disincentive argument has been made against UI since the earliest 
days of its consideration. It is part of the philosophy that social pro 
grams weaken the work ethic, sap self-discipline, and create a growing 
dependence on transfer payments that "have imposed a rising burden 
of taxation on working families which has provoked a spirit of anger 
and frustration with American democratic institutions" (Gilder 1981, p. 
137). This threat of moral decline and malingering has been the prime 
argument by opponents to broadening the UI system.
During the 1970s, when many states constrained weekly benefit 
amounts and the duration of benefits they provided, even as unemploy 
ment levels were rising, the disincentive case was pressed more force 
fully. Higher unemployment rates were alleged to be due, at least in 
part, to generous UI benefits. These charges relied on a body of 
research that empirically tested for evidence of the effects of unem 
ployment benefits on the level and duration of joblessness. Researchers 
attempted to measure how changes in various parameters of the pro 
gram, like the weekly benefit amount, the wage replacement rate, and 
the entitled duration of benefits, influenced the duration of insured 
unemployment. No two studies were exactly comparable. They dif 
fered with respect to the types of data used, the specifications of the
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hypotheses to be tested, the definitions of the variables, the behavioral 
assumptions adopted, and the kinds of analytical approaches applied. 20 
Despite their noncomparabilities and varying results, the studies did 
supply evidence in support of the effects hypothesized. For example, 
after reviewing the methodology and findings of a dozen studies of the 
effects of UI on the duration of unemployment, Hamermesh concluded 
that
the best estimate—if one chooses a simple figure—is that a 10- 
percentage point increase in the gross replacement rate leads to an 
increase in the duration of insured unemployment of about half a 
week when labor markets are tight. This is not an exact figure, but 
it does appear that there is some effect, certainly above zero and 
probably less than one week (Hamermesh 1977, p. 37).
The findings of these studies suggest that increased UI liberality 
reduces the incentive to return to work. Research about the size and 
significance of the work disincentive has continued. Some analysts 
have advanced the countervailing thesis that, by allowing recipients to 
search more extensively for suitable work, improved benefits enhance 
the efficiency of the labor market. Thus, a rise in unemployment dura 
tion could prove beneficial to the economy as well as to the recipient in 
the longer run. Attempts to measure the favorable job search effects of 
UI have been few and have not been regarded as satisfactory (Welch 
1977). Overall, findings from research done in this period provided 
some support for stricter benefit eligibility rules and less generous pay 
ment levels so as to minimize work disincentives.
It was argued that the narrow gap between the net after-tax wage 
workers might earn on a job and the weekly UI benefit amount was an 
important element contributing to the disincentive effect of unemploy 
ment benefits. Feldstein (1974) focused on this factor and showed how 
taxes withheld from wages could severely limit the monetary advan 
tage of working over drawing benefits. His analyses helped to support 
the case for taxing unemployment benefits as income, a policy adopted 
beginning in 1979 for recipients in households with incomes above 
specified levels, and applied universally regardless of income levels 
beginning in 1986. A study by Solon (1985), examining the experience 
in Georgia during the first year the new tax policy took effect, provided 
some evidence that benefit recipients at income levels subject to the tax
Unemployment Insurance in the United States 27
had a significantly shorter duration of unemployment, on average, than 
recipients at similar income levels the year before the tax applied. 
Recipients at lower income levels showed no reduction in average 
duration levels over these two years.
The work disincentive argument, fortified by the research findings, 
was used by those who wished to curtail the liberality of the UI pro 
gram. The taxation of benefits was a direct outcome of this movement. 
As Vroman (1990) documents, the benefit funding crises experienced 
by many states following the back-to-back recessions of 1980 and 
1982 exerted further pressure on the states to restrict benefits and to 
tighten eligibility rules.
More recent studies of UI work disincentive effects have used differ 
ent or refined research methodologies. 21 Katz and Meyer (1990) pro 
duced some of the biggest disincentive effect estimates yet. They found 
that a 10 percentage point rise in the UI wage replacement rate 
increased the average duration of insured unemployment by 1.5 weeks. 
Davidson and Woodbury (1996) have found estimates closer to results 
from studies done in the 1970s. Using an equilibrium search and 
matching model calibrated with data from several UI field experiments 
conducted in the 1980s, they found that a "10 percentage point increase 
in the UI wage replacement rate can be expected to increase the unem 
ployment duration of UI claimants by between 0.3 and 1.1 weeks" 
(Davidson and Woodbury 1996, p. 25).
Among both researchers and policy makers, there has recently been 
great interest in positive reemployment incentives for UI beneficiaries. 
While stricter eligibility rules with respect to job search requirements 
may be considered something of a stick, the spur to reemployment 
efforts is viewed more as a carrot. Positive reemployment incentives 
have appeared as a natural alternative to further costly administrative 
monitoring of compliance with work search requirements. The Office 
of the Chief Economist of the U.S. Department of Labor summarized 
research findings from a variety of experiments testing new reemploy 
ment incentives for UI beneficiaries. 22 Field experiments involving ran 
domized trials of various positive reemployment incentives for UI 
beneficiaries have been conducted in the states of Illinois, Massachu 
setts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington. These incentives 
have included cash bonuses, self-employment allowances, referral to 
retraining, and individually tailored job search assistance. The experi-
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ments have led the way to federal legislation permitting states to offer 
self-employment allowances and requiring referral to job search assis 
tance for some UI recipients.
The compulsory initiative to come out of the research on positive 
reemployment incentives for UI claimants, the Worker Profiling and 
Re-employment Services system, was required by legislation enacted 
in 1993. This system has given a new, positive role to the cooperative 
agreement between UI and reemployment service providers—the pub 
lic employment service and the JTPA system. Previously, the only link 
between the two organizations was that, in most states, the employ 
ment service helped to enforce the UI work test, largely through regis 
tration with the employment services as well as with some placement 
efforts. For claimants identified as being most likely to exhaust UI ben 
efits, participation in reemployment activities is an additional eligibil 
ity requirement for continued benefit receipt.
Fraud and Abuse
To qualify for UI benefits, in addition to being involuntarily sepa 
rated from work, the individual must want employment, be able to 
work, be available and prepared to take a suitable job, and make appro 
priate efforts to regain employment. These conditions are imposed in 
an attempt to affirm that unemployment is an insurable risk, that is, to 
reduce the moral hazard in UI, the risk of compensating malingering 
rather than genuine unemployment. An individual's unemployment 
following a job separation can be, to a greater or lesser degree, a func 
tion of how much he or she truly wants to work. The worker files for UI 
benefits for each week claimed as a week of unemployment. It is 
administratively very difficult to monitor whether the worker is earnest 
about actually becoming reemployed. This is a classic example of the 
principal-agent problem, which is familiar in private insurance mar 
kets. Unless the claimant admits a lack of interest in working, there is 
no objective way of assessing the genuine desire for work, short of 
being able to offer a suitable job opportunity. The UI system seeks evi 
dence in other ways, mainly on the basis of the individual's pattern of 
behavior or circumstances, which might indicate a weak interest in
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working. This largely subjective approach is a difficult one to adminis 
ter. It is a process open to a wide range of judgment; it is fraught with 
suspicion and uncertainty and is frequently contentious.
Historically, certain kinds of UI claimants have tended to arouse 
more suspicion about their reemployment intentions than others. These 
include spouses of fully employed workers, students and other teenag 
ers living with their parents, workers between seasonal jobs, and pen 
sioners. Since involuntary unemployment is difficult to prove in so 
many situations, one school of thought holds that the provisions of UI 
law should be strict enough to ensure that benefits go to only those who 
are unquestionably and demonstrably involuntarily unemployed. The 
other school of thought holds that the unemployed worker should be 
given the benefit of the doubt and that the law should be liberal in test 
ing the readiness of the worker to find employment. This philosophical 
difference partly explains the variation in eligibility rules across 
states.23 It also helps to explain the variation in the severity of the dis 
qualifications imposed. For example, the first school of thought would 
apply blanket disqualifications to all persons who quit their jobs to 
relocate geographically with a moving spouse. Those holding to the 
second school of thought would permit the payment of benefits to such 
workers if they demonstrated that they were available and able to work 
in the area of their new residence. In fact, there has been a gradual 
tightening of eligibility conditions for a wide variety of causes, and 
there has been a similar tightening of disqualifications from receiving 
benefits from a fixed time period to the entire duration of the spell. This 
has been a fight that benefit rights advocates have gradually but 
steadily lost in the states.24
The subjective character of unemployment is an important factor 
contributing to the differential treatment of claimants across jurisdic 
tions. Apart from variations in statutory provisions that reflect oppos 
ing schools of thought, there are differences among the states in 
administrative policies and procedures as they are applied in determin 
ing the validity of claims. The potential for abuse in this troublesome 
area, both by the claimant and of the rights of the claimant, constitutes 
another source of controversy for the program.
The perception of the extent to which beneficiaries abuse the UI pro 
gram affects attitudes toward many of its provisions. Periodically, the 
system has been subject to attacks in the news media, which attempt to
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prove, or at least to imply strongly, that benefits are being paid to large 
numbers of "loafers, quitters, schemers and cheaters."25 The instances 
of abuse described run the gamut of situations involving violations of 
specific provisions in many of the state laws. Examples cited often 
include students, pregnant women, women who have quit their jobs to 
fulfill marital obligations, seasonal workers, and vacationers, all of 
whom, in the opinion of the critic, are not very interested in taking 
work and therefore abuse the system by drawing benefits. Disqualifica 
tion provisions for voluntary quitting or discharge for misconduct are 
attacked as being too lenient and leading to abuse of the system. The 
cases are not always situations in which outright fraud is perpetrated 
but include ones in which the worker is alleged to have taken advan 
tage of some provision or interpretation of the law in a manner that 
constitutes an abuse. The criticism is directed at the offending provi 
sion as one allowing the payment of benefits when it should not. These 
cases generally are not run-of-the-mill examples but are unusual ones 
that, in most instances, have been the subject of review by appeals tri 
bunals, even by the courts, and in which benefits have been awarded. 
Such cases are usually on the borderline; otherwise, they would not 
have reached the appeal stage. The U.S. Department of Labor has often 
found that the facts cited by the critics are taken out of context and fail 
to include the extenuating circumstances that led to the final award of 
benefits (U.S. Department of Labor 1960). Occasionally, a presumably 
fraudulent case is identified in the media with information not previ 
ously available to the administrative agency. Given this information, 
the agency would not pay the benefits. 26 The media criticisms often 
select particular cases because they support an attack on the legal pro 
visions that permit the payment of benefits in such instances.
Given the criticisms of the mid-1970s and the mounting pressures 
exerted by the financial strains most state programs experienced, it is 
not surprising that the trend turned strongly in the direction of stiffer 
eligibility rules, more severe disqualifications, and tighter administra 
tion. The first move was a broadened and strengthened application of 
work search rules. Many states increased requirements for claimants to 
furnish specific evidence of their job search, usually by indicating the 
names of a minimum number of employers contacted each week.
In response to concern about the potential for fraud and abuse in the 
UI system, Burgess and Kingston (1980) undertook a six-city study of
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the accuracy of benefit payments for the National Commission on 
Unemployment Compensation. They estimated that 50 percent of ben 
efit overpayments identified by intensive study, ex post, were due to 
either the "failure of claimants to conduct active job searches or by 
claimants' unavailability for work" (Burgess and Kingston 1980, p. 
508). These findings led to more comprehensive research to develop 
and test a method to intensively audit a random sample of claims paid. 
Such a study was conducted in five states between April 1981 and 
March 1982. The results from this more involved investigation indi 
cated that about 14 percent of all benefits paid in these states during the 
period were in excess of the entitled amount. Furthermore, the princi 
pal reason for the overpayments, accounting for nearly half to four- 
fifths of the total amounts overpaid in each of the states, was inade 
quate work search—failure to meet the work search requirement which 
was not detected when the claim was filed and processed for payment.
Beginning in calendar year 1988 as the Benefits Quality Control 
Program, the random sample audit procedure was introduced as a stan 
dard operation throughout the nation. It has produced estimates of error 
rates similar to those found in the pilot studies. In calendar year 1993, 
for all states reporting, the estimated error rate was 8.8 percent of a 
total of $21.05 billion in benefit payments. 27 This error rate is in line 
with rates of the last few years, but lower than estimated in the first few 
years that benefit payment accuracy was checked by random audit.
The trend among the states toward stiffer enforcement of the work 
test was reversed following nationwide implementation of the Benefits 
Quality Control Program. It may be the case that the relaxed stringency 
of the work test is due to an effort on the part of the states to lower their 
error rates, and to perform better on the quality control random audit, 
since failure of the work test remains a prime reason for payment 
errors.
Debate continues over whether an active weekly work search 
requirement applied generally to claimants contributes much to speed 
ier reemployment in many cases. Reasonable and useful job search 
may call for different approaches, depending on a claimant's occupa 
tion and experience, on the recruiting and hiring practices of potential 
employers, and on the current condition of the labor market. Many 
states provide for certain exemptions or departures from their active 
search requirements to reflect these practical realities. This approach
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makes for even more complexity but attempts, at least, to minimize 
fruitless efforts by claimants and annoyances to employers that serve 
only to satisfy a bureaucratic rule but do not lead to reemployment. Is 
the evidence of substantial overpayments of benefits an indication of 
widespread abuse? Of a lack of interest in work? Would stricter 
enforcement of the work search requirements eliminate many benefit 
payments, or would it induce claimants to make more effort to meet the 
requirements even if it served no other purpose?
Up until recently, the work test was generally a mechanical process: 
if individuals indicated that they were able and available for work, and 
if they listed three separate employer job search contacts or, in some 
states, simply indicated that they searched for work, usually nothing 
else was done by the state agency. Some states claim to check the 
validity of listed work searches contacts; this is unlikely.
The decline in the UI work test is mostly in the elimination of the 
certification of having searched for work with a given number of 
employers in the previous week and naming those employers on the 
continued claims form. These changes may partially reflect an effort to 
reduce reported error rates under the Benefits Quality Control Pro 
gram.
A field experiment conducted in Tacoma, Washington, investigated 
whether the traditional work test of requiring three employer contacts 
reduced UI benefit duration and payments relative to no work test or to 
significantly more intensive work search requirements. Based on this 
experiment, Johnson and Klepinger (1994) estimated that, if UI checks 
continue with self-certification for continued receipt and no reporting 
requirement, benefit duration will increase by 3.3 weeks relative to the 
traditional work test. In addition, they found that significantly more 
aggressive work search assistance is likely to shorten benefit duration 
by about half a week as compared to the customary three contacts work 
test. The evidence from Washington resulted in the U.S. Department of 
Labor funding an additional alternative work search experiment in 
Maryland. 28
There is no doubt that there are cases in which claimants take advan 
tage of provisions in state laws that permit some latitude in interpreta 
tion. Recent trends have lowered that latitude and, thus, have reduced 
opportunities for abuse. The tightening of eligibility rules and stiffened 
enforcement have also eliminated some claims that were previously
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regarded as valid and free of any questions. To the extent that the pub 
lic sees UI abuse as a serious problem, the program will be controver 
sial in those areas suspected of vulnerability to such practices.
In evaluating the overpayments issue, Kingston, Burgess, and St. 
Louis (1983), who pioneered the random audit procedure, noted cer 
tain "features of the unemployment insurance program which contrib 
uted significantly to the problem." Prominent among these were the 
complexity of the program's eligibility provisions and policies, the 
limitations in administrative resources that made it unlikely that 
agency staff could monitor claimant compliance with the rules effec 
tively and equitably, and the weaknesses in the program's incentives 
for detecting and restraining improper payments. 29 Reflecting more 
broadly on ways to reduce problems of fraud and abuse, Burgess and 
Kingston identified six desirable features of a UI system:
(1) appropriate economic incentives for all system participants, 
including strong incentives for claimant self-compliance; (2) to 
the extent possible, simple rather than complex system features 
and eligibility criteria; (3) to the extent possible, little emphasis on 
intensive administrative scrutiny of claimant behavior and motives 
in the routine operational system, with emphasis instead placed on 
self-compliance with relatively objective and easily measurable 
criteria; (4) minimizing the administrative discretion that makes 
selective application and enforcement of eligibility criteria possi 
ble; (5) horizontal equity for system participants; and (6) incen 
tives for both administrative efficiency and smaller administrative 
bureaucracies (Burgess and Kingston 1987, pp. 258-259).
Conflicting Employer and Labor Views of the System
Long before the establishment of the federal-state UI system in the 
United States, both employers and labor opposed it as a compulsory 
public program, although for different reasons. Labor's reservations 
were founded in suspicions developed following many years of consis 
tent hostility by government authorities toward worker efforts to orga 
nize and to press demands for better wages and working conditions. 
The principal union leadership stood against any governmental
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involvement in labor-management relations and preferred to deal 
directly with management to resolve mutual problems. It was not until 
1932 that the position of organized labor shifted to support for UI.
Employer opposition was also rooted in history as well as in classi 
cal economic theory. Starting with the decline of feudalism and con 
tinuing through the industrial revolution to the dominance of modern 
corporate enterprise, the tradition of employer responsibility for the 
personal welfare of employees weakened to the vanishing point. Indi 
vidual employers could and did sympathize with individual workers 
who suffered the hardships of unemployment, but this was usually sep 
arated from any economic responsibility. 30 Applying classical eco 
nomic theory, unemployment was viewed as the result of a temporary 
imperfection, an imbalance in the market that was readily corrected as 
wages adjusted to levels at which the demand for labor would absorb 
the excess supply. Tampering with the operation of this mechanism, 
such as by government intervention, was thought to endanger the cor 
rective process and to possibly delay or prevent the restoration of equi 
librium at full employment. In this context, UI was regarded as 
interference in the market adjustment.
The massive and prolonged unemployment of the depression dam 
aged the credibility of classical economic theory. The theory held that, 
in the long run, prices would adjust so that markets would clear, mean 
ing that unemployment would vanish. In response to this line of think 
ing, John Maynard Keynes, who advocated government management 
of aggregate spending in the economy and who changed the way econ 
omists view severe economic recessions, wrote that "in the long run 
we're all dead" (Heilbroner 1953, p. 251).
Although the momentum for UI began to build, employers generally 
held to their opposition. Since the proposed plans placed most or all of 
the UI financial burden on employers, their opposition focused on the 
taxes to be levied on them. The UI taxes were viewed as a further 
impediment to business, at a time when most were struggling to stay 
afloat, and as a competitive disadvantage in interstate commerce 
(Ewing 1933, p. 13). Moreover, the tax reversed historic trends by 
compelling employers to assume some responsibility for the welfare of 
their employees, representing another step back from free enterprise. 
Opposition on these grounds was expressed by Noel Sargent of the 
National Association of Manufacturers before a select committee of
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the United States Senate in 1931: "Penalization of employers because 
of unemployment resulting from conditions over which the employer 
has little control is both ethically and economically unjustified" (U.S. 
Senate 1931).
The injection of experience rating into the UI system made the pro 
gram more acceptable to employers. It was reasoned that, by allocating 
benefit costs to those businesses giving rise to compensated unemploy 
ment, experience rating helped to keep UI consistent with the free mar 
ket system. The costs of the goods and services produced by insured 
workers thus would also reflect the costs of benefits paid to them if 
they experienced involuntary unemployment. Because of market com 
petition, employers, seeking to minimize costs, are motivated to avoid 
or minimize unemployment of their workers. In this way, it is argued, 
experience rating serves the twin goals of appropriate economic cost 
allocation and employment stability. Furthermore, the tax offset 
scheme introduced by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1935 
allayed most fears about competitive disadvantage across states.
These theoretical concerns were prevalent before 1935, when the 
Social Security Act required states to establish UI systems. After the 
system was up and running, there was an added practical concern by 
employers about experience rating. As noted earlier, UI costs at the 
outset were on the whole less than they were expected to be and well 
under the standard tax rates levied by the states. The only way allowed 
under the system to reduce tax rates was through experience rating. As 
experience rating spread and tax rates declined, many employers 
became increasingly sensitive to benefit costs and to charges against 
their accounts.
The concept took hold among employers that they should pay only 
the cost of benefits related to their own layoffs of workers. This view is 
a major reason for general employer advocacy of many restrictions on 
benefit payments to workers whose unemployment is not attributable 
to their employers. Labor has opposed experience rating, claiming that 
it leads employers to be restrictive about their employees' benefit 
rights and to challenge claims unjustifiably so as to keep down charges 
and tax rates.
Labor and management have been natural antagonists with respect 
to UI. Employers generally resist any expansion or liberalization that 
would add to costs. Labor's interest is to press for generous levels of
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benefit support during unemployment, for as long a period as neces 
sary, with relatively few restrictions on eligibility. The confrontation of 
these diametrically opposed interests assures conflict on nearly every 
aspect of the program.
Since specific UI elements are defined by law, the conflict usually 
centers on the legislative process, mostly at the state level. The detailed 
provisions of state law are of prime importance to employers, individu 
ally and collectively, given their sensitivity to cost. Few sophisticated 
employers feel that they can stress or even discuss candidly their con 
cern over costs. Much of their discussion and debate deals with less 
tangible matters such as "insurance principles," "equities," "abuses," 
and "work disincentives," arguments that play useful roles in legisla 
tive maneuvering. On the other side, labor's efforts stress the hardships 
endured by the unemployed and the inadequacy of UI benefits to alle 
viate deprivation and suffering. Not all employer and labor representa 
tives hold unreservedly to these positions. Many come to a responsible 
conclusion with a balanced resolution of the conflict. At times, the two 
sides may bring an agreed upon bill before the state legislature, the 
result of concessions and compromises. This approach does not always 
serve the public's best interest, however, if employers agree to a benefit 
increase in return for labor's agreement not to oppose a tax reduction, 
with the solvency of the fund weakened in the process.
Throughout much of the program's history, employer influence at 
the state level in many parts of the country has been greater than that of 
labor in shaping UI provisions. Where union strength has been more 
concentrated, as in heavily industrialized states, the results have been 
more balanced. Labor, however, has felt that its views have received a 
better response at the federal level than in the states, at least until 1980. 
Labor has favored more federal UI control, such as through the imposi 
tion of minimum benefit standards, and even complete federalization 
of the program, arguing that unemployed workers have been treated 
inadequately and inequitably under widely disparate state laws. 
Employers oppose increased federal control of the program, usually on 
the basis of political philosophy, arguing the dangers and inefficiencies 
of operation or dominance by a remote, cumbersome central govern 
ment.
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing into the 1990s, the fed 
eral government has increased the number of federal compliance rules
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that affect the discretionary authority of states over their own UI laws. 
However, these changes have not usually been supportive of organized 
labor's goals for the program. Union membership in the United States 
has declined dramatically in the past half century, falling from 35.5 
percent of the work force in 1945 to 15.8 percent in 1995 (7995 World 
Almanac and Book of Facts, p. 154). The influence of organized labor 
has in advocating its UI objectives has accordingly diminished. The 
financial difficulties encountered by many of the states in the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s have pushed UI taxes higher despite the usual 
employer resistance. It seems fair to say, however, that some of the past 
extremes of the employer-labor UI controversy have eased somewhat. 
Responsible leadership on both sides is usually able to reach some rea 
sonable accommodation to protect the system's basic integrity. More 
over, the narrower employer and labor concerns are giving way more 
often to broader public considerations.
Federal-State Relationships and Conflicts
The decision at the outset to establish UI as a federal-state system 
did not end striving for a wholly federal system after the program 
began. Champions of the federal approach, some of whom held impor 
tant staff positions at the Social Security Board, pressed their case 
strongly during World War II, when the state employment services 
were nationalized. As noted earlier, the Board itself recommended that 
UI also be converted to a uniform federal program. The Truman admin 
istration opposed the return of the employment service to the states 
after a period of wartime federalization. State officials successfully 
organized themselves to help defeat attempts to eliminate or to reduce 
their role in the employment service at that time. As a result of these 
early experiences and later because of a states' rights philosophy, state 
employment security administrators generally looked upon nearly all 
subsequent federal legislative proposals to broaden UI as efforts to 
assert greater federal control over the system, even well after any active 
hope for federalization had been abandoned. Opposition to these pro 
posals frequently was ideological and did not address their intrinsic 
merits.
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Throughout much of the first four decades of the UI program, 
employer groups allied themselves with state administrators in oppos 
ing liberal federal proposals, which labor tended to support. Not all 
state officials lined up in the same way during this period, but the 
majority of them did. On the whole, this combined opposition suc 
ceeded in blocking, slowing, or limiting changes in the system through 
federal laws. For example, federal minimum benefit standards have 
been proposed repeatedly, often with broad support, as a means of 
overcoming the persistent failure of the majority of states to provide 
adequate benefit levels under their own provisions. On a few occasions, 
one or more of the proposed standards came close to passage, but in the 
end, none was ever adopted. Preference for retention of state control of 
these matters was a major factor in the outcome, even in cases of 
acknowledged program inadequacies.
The federal role in the UI system, nevertheless, did expand as the 
result of two major developments beginning in the 1970s. One was the 
permanent provision of extended benefits for the long-term unem 
ployed during periods of high unemployment, as mandated by the per 
manent federal-state shared program adopted by Congress in 1970. 
The other development was the widespread insolvency of state UI 
funds during the 1970s and 1980s, which called into play the provi 
sions of the federal loan fund. Repeated use of federal-state shared 
extended benefits plus wholly federal supplemental extensions during 
the 1970s and 1980s gradually increased the number of federal rules 
applicable to benefit entitlement provisions, which heretofore had been 
exclusively state concerns. Although the federal rules applied only to 
the extended and supplemental benefits, they could not help but influ 
ence regular state benefits as well.
The financial problems of the period produced even more pervasive 
federal influence over state programs. Blaustein (1993, chapter 9) 
describes how the evolution of federal loan and repayment provisions 
structured incentives and penalties that have induced states in debt to 
restrict benefit eligibility and benefit levels and to increase tax levies in 
order to overcome insolvency. During the 1980s, a number of federal 
requirements were also enacted that had some direct impact on state 
benefit provisions; in effect, these amounted to federal benefit stan 
dards. In these cases, however, the requirements operated to make 
states pay less rather than more in benefits. It is ironic that such federal
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provisions circumscribing state control should have been put through 
by a Reagan administration that was publicly committed to reducing 
the power and role of the federal government and to strengthening the 
role of the states in the interest of a "new federalism." The basic pur 
pose of these provisions, however, was to lower the costs of the UI pro 
gram, and this could be done expeditiously only by amending federal 
law with respect to the federal, rather than state, UI programs.
There has been an uneasy balance of power between the states and 
the federal government over the administration of the UI program. Fed 
eral law specifies broad administrative standards to which the states 
must conform. States are free to structure and operate their UI pro 
grams within these broad constraints. Over time, federal constraints 
have declined. Highly detailed budgeting in the 1950s and 1960s— 
when the purchase of individual capital equipment items had to be 
approved by the U.S. Department of Labor—changed to broader cate 
gorical grants in the 1970s. Finally, the states were given "bottom line" 
authority between grant categories beginning in 1986. Despite this 
gradual relaxation of administrative rules, over the years, this entire 
area has been a source of friction between the two partners in the sys 
tem. In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration moved to alter that 
arrangement by proposing "devolution." The federal government 
would surrender many of its responsibilities for and power over state 
program administration. It would also reduce the federal unemploy 
ment tax by an amount equivalent to that portion going to support state 
program administration. States would then be left free to determine 
how they preferred to administer their own programs and how to 
finance the costs involved. Despite years of federal-state controversy, 
as of 1997, the system for financing state administration remains 
unchanged. Many states have claimed that a fair share of administra 
tive financing dollars has not been returned to them because of federal 
efforts to reduce the persistent annual federal budget deficits. Mean 
while, in the face of rapid improvements in information processing 
capabilities, there has been no agreement on what constitutes efficient 
administration of UI.
The nature of the federal-state system is such that some conflict 
between the two partners is inevitable. Given the federal structure of 
our governmental arrangements, it would appear that the particular UI 
approach chosen offered a means of serving urgent national economic
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needs while preserving the state and local fabric that comprises the 
web of our society. The balance is a delicate one, never perfect, and 
often in flux. Some critics of the federal-state approach to UI see the 
problem of unemployment as increasingly countrywide, requiring a 
national remedy. Others see the problem as varied as the nation's geog 
raphy and believe the solution cannot lie in application of broad uni 
form standards; they favor more state control and experimentation, out 
of which would emerge better solutions. Still others feel that the exist 
ing system provides the framework for debate yielding the best balance 
of federal and state ideas. 31
Despite conflicts between the states and the federal government, the 
federal-state relationship in the UI system has retained support in the 
1990s. While there is an active movement to return training programs 
and even the public employment service to the states in the form of 
block grants, the federal-state UI system looks quite secure. The 
advantages of a highly decentralized UI system with a measure of fed 
eral oversight are appealing from both policy and political perspectives 
at a time when the twin missions of the UI program—providing indi 
vidual income assistance and macroeconomic stabilization—continue 
to have wide public backing. Although the balance of responsibilities 
in the federal-state UI system is apt to fluctuate, the basic structure of 
the system is likely to remain intact for the foreseeable future. The 
same cannot be said for other employment and training initiatives. Part 
of the explanation for this difference may be the strength of the federal- 
state nature of the UI program.
Judgment as a Source of Disagreement
Even if there were no conflicts of interest in UI, many issues would 
be difficult to settle to everyone's satisfaction. Rarely are there matters 
for which the facts available are completely adequate to answer all the 
questions involved. Research and data analyses can go far to narrow 
the areas of uncertainty and dispute that surround specific issues. Yet 
the research results are not always altogether clear-cut and unqualified. 
The data and their analyses are not always directly or perfectly relevant 
to the issue at hand, and the conclusions inferred are not entirely
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unequivocal. As has been noted with regard to the work disincentive 
studies of the 1970s, for example, researchers can differ in their meth 
ods and in the types of data used, with varying results. These studies 
have supplied an idea of the direction and general magnitude of some 
disincentive effects, but the question remains unresolved as to whether 
the effects measured are significant enough to warrant specific policy 
action. The research even makes possible estimates of the conse 
quences of such action through simulation techniques, but here, too, 
there are limitations because not all the factors that can influence 
events have been accounted for, or because some factors may change 
and turn out to be more critical than expected, leading to unanticipated 
results.
What remains, therefore, is the need to evaluate the implications of 
the information provided and finally to exercise judgment about the 
policy action proposed. In making such judgments, people will differ 
because no one is free from predilections or biases or, stated more pos 
itively, because individuals hold disparate values. For example, where 
to set the weekly UI benefit amount is an issue that involves value 
judgments. Given that a prime objective of the program is to alleviate 
hardship during unemployment, the weekly amount should be ade 
quate to satisfy that end. But what is adequate? How is hardship to be 
measured? Benefit adequacy research has examined various measures 
of expenditures of the unemployed as the levels to be sustained by the 
benefit received. What should be included among those expenditures is 
debatable. Furthermore, for a given definition of expenditures, what 
proportion of beneficiaries should receive a benefit adequate to sustain 
them—50 percent? 67 percent? 90 percent? How should the concern 
about the effects of higher benefit amounts on recipient work incen 
tives be weighed in considering a level to set? How should the effects 
on costs and taxes be taken into account?
In short, a number of subjective judgments are called into play in 
deciding weekly benefit amount policy and almost every UI provision. 
For nearly every feature of the program, multiple choices exist con 
cerning what the policy should be. Each provision adopted by a legisla 
tive body usually represents a choice among alternatives, based on the 
judgment of the majority of the legislators and often achieved through 
compromise and trade-offs. Controversy need not be a bad or destruc 
tive fate for UI as long as reasonable adversaries maintain mutual
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respect for their differing judgments. Many objective observers would 
likely agree that the results can improve and strengthen the program, as 
they have over the life of UI in the United States.
NOTES
1. See Wandner, Robinson, and Manheimer (1984) for a discussion of UI schemes in develop 
ing countries.
2 See the discussion in Breul (1965).
3 Brechlmg and Laurence (1995) provide an extensive analysis of how experience-rated UI 
tax systems might deal with the problem of financing permanent as opposed to temporary layoffs.
4. One of the most prominent of these expressions came from President Reagan at a press con 
ference in January 1982, when, in response to a question about the gravity of the current unem 
ployment problem, he noted having recently counted many pages of help-wanted advertisements 
in the newspaper, implying that there were plenty of jobs available (New York Times, January 20, 
1982, p. A-30) A later "explanation" of his comment acknowledged that some of the jobs listed 
called for skills that many of the unemployed did not have
5. The surveys involved random samples of between 1,000 and 1,500 each time the question 
was asked. Results of the surveys were provided by the Roper Center at the University of Con 
necticut.
6 In chapter 8, evidence on the extent to which the experience-rated UI tax system acts to sta 
bilize employment is reviewed.
7. Opposition to government transfer payments may be part of the reason that Blank and Card 
(1991) found that only about 70 percent of those eligible for UI benefits actually draw them.
8. In February 1995, an attack on UI came from very high in the federal government. Within 
weeks of being seated as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Newt Gingnch said, "if 
you're not at work, why are we paying you...[unemployment insurance] is not a vacation fund." 
He cited UI as an example of a government program that discourages job creation by encouraging 
out-of-work people to sit and collect money instead of learning new skills (Rice 1995).
9. Similar linkages between unemployment compensation and active employment measures 
have been forged in other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries See Brodsky (1994, pp. 58-59)
10 An excellent overview of the history and philosophy of the insurance concept is given in 
Mahsoff(1961).
11. A similar argument about social security is made by Cohen and Beedon (1994).
12. While the weekly UI benefit is limited because of social adequacy considerations, private 
supplementary unemployment insurance is available. Workers may purchase—in a fashion similar 
to credit life and disability insurance on loans—unemployment insurance that guarantees periodic 
consumer loan payments dunng unemployment up to a certain duration. This option may repre 
sent a significant supplement in a consumer society where virtually everything from homes and 
cars to groceries and air travel may be purchased on credit.
13. Blaustein (1993, p 47), from a statement of UI objectives issued by the U.S. Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, in 1955.
14. In the United States prior to the 1930s, the only reliable employment data came from the 
decennial census. The census relied on the gainful worker concept, which excluded unemploy 
ment since most of the unemployed held a job at one time or another during the interview year 
(Levitan, Mangum, and Marshall 1981, p. 77).
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15. Blaustem (1981) proposed a type of unemployment assistance as part of a suggested three- 
tier system of job and income security for workers.
16. Note that the benefits listed in table 1.2 do not include payments for extended or third-tier 
programs.
17. A further stabilizing influence may be exerted by the UI benefit financing mechanisms 
While UI benefit payments increase during recessions, tax payments by employers for those ben 
efits occur gradually over a period ranging between 4 and 24 calendar quarters later. The full ben 
efit repayment burden is not placed on employers during recessionary times.
18. The $700 billion figure for 1993 includes the largest entitlement program, social security 
old age pensions, which does not means test payments
19. Sinner (1972), who advocated using the Unemployment Trust Fund for training, provides 
an early comparative review of active labor programs and financing in Europe and the United 
States. A more recent review is provided by Schmid, Reissert, and Bruche (1992).
20 See papers in the symposium edited by Arnold Katz (1977).
21 Atkmson and Micklewnght (1991) provide an excellent survey of the literature.
22. See section 5 of U S Department of Labor, Office of the Chief Economist (1995)
23 Part of the present variation in eligibility rules across states has resulted from changes over 
time in response to the realities of the differing industrial mix of employment and unemployment 
and the impact of these on benefit payments and UI tax levies.
24. The trends in statutes can be followed in the various revisions to U.S. Department of 
Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws
25 Examples are Gilmore (1960, 1964); and "Another RipofP" Sixty Minutes, April 25, 1976
26 A claimant for unemployment benefits interviewed on the CBS Sixty Minutes program of 
Apnl 1976, who admitted that he did not seek or want work, a fact he concealed from the state 
agency when he filed his claim, was disqualified from drawing benefits the morning after the pro 
gram was shown.
27 See US. Department of Labor (1994)
28. Results from the Maryland experiment are to be available in late rrud-1997.
29. See Kingston, Burgess, and St Louis (1983).
30 Nelson (1969, p. 47) states that "at least twenty-three company unemployment-insurance 
funds, covering approximately 60,000 workers, were in operation at one time or another between 
1916 and 1934. There were never more than sixteen plans in effect at one time, and this peak was 
reached only in 1931."
31. This is the view advanced by Rubm (1983) at the conclusion of his book
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